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Linking Disparate Approaches to the Study of Social Norms: An
Example from Northern Siberia
John P. Ziker
Boise State University

Abstract
This article examines altruistic social norms among the Dolgans and the Nganasans in
Arctic Siberia, drawing on and integrating experimental game theory and semiotic
approaches. The article demonstrates the complementarity of these two methodologies in
order to more fully understand how sharing is promoted over individual selfaggrandizement in a communal-resource property regime. Any theory of social norms
should be of some practical benefit for solving current environmental dilemmas, as well as
for increasing understanding of the factors lending sustainability to human-environment
relationships. With that goal in mind, the article presents results of experimental games
conducted in the Taimyr Autonomous Region in 2003, along with an analysis of
indigenous communication (sayings, aphorisms, taboos, etc.) aimed at the promotion of
altruistic social norms. A synthesis of the two approaches is outlined with implications for
the broader literature on hunting peoples across the north and beyond.
Keywords: abduction, common-pool resources, dictator game, Taimyr, traditional ecological knowledge,
ultimatum game

Theoretical Preliminaries
As the scale of human groups and social networks has increased over time, the question of cooperation becomes
increasingly relevant from theoretical and applied perspectives because the greater the scale, the more numerous
the opportunities for defection will be. Defection occurs where the benefits of social life are taken but the costs
are not paid. This phenomenon is also known as the “free-rider” problem. Where groups are large, economic
differentiation ensues, profit maximization1 is justified and even encouraged, and defection on communal
resource regimes, cooperative husbanding, or conservation is more likely. Many large societies have institutions
and specialized occupations involved in monitoring and controlling behavior to prevent especially egregious
breakdowns. Nonetheless, defection occurs, and common-pool resources, particularly those subject to
externalized costs such as biodiversity, air and watersheds, are vulnerable to degradation (Borgerhoff-Mulder
and Coppolillo 2005: 144). There has been a move to address “free rider” problems as “second-order collective
action” problems in anthropological analyses of social dilemmas (e.g., Ruttan 1998). The second-order problem
is: Who monitors and controls those whose “job” it is to monitor and control? Monitoring and control are
facilitated through a variety of cultural traditions and social institutions, including property rights, social
organization, government, and co- management, which have been the traditional focus in anthropology (e.g.,
McKay and Acheson 1987; Trawick 2001).
In the game theory literature the use of formal techniques (like economic experiments) is described and
discussed as a means to study universal and foundational aspects of human social behavior (Henrich et al.
2004). This approach makes “bounded” rational-choice assumptions about participants.2 Formal techniques have
a number of limitations, but a major advantage is that the results of the same protocol (properly translated) are
directly comparable across societies and through time. Pure rational-choice models are problematic on a crosscultural basis, and it is widely recognized that such models are fair predictors of economic behavior only in
market-based societies (Frydman and Goldberg 2007). Therefore, an assumption of bounded rationality
underpins all decision-making models discussed here, as this perspective admits limits to the abilities of the
human mind to calculate optimal outcomes (Girgerenzer and Selton 2002; Ostrom 2003). An experimental
approach is useful for developing models of cooperation as empirically identifiable relationships between
variables that can tell us something about our decision making and the factors that affect it across space and
time.
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Where small-scale, indigenous societies are incorporated into large-scale societies based on industrial
production, many researchers have found the continuation of communal property regimes and the pro-social
norms and preferences that support them, despite the change in economic production (Barnard 2002; Bowles
and Gintis 1998). The perpetuation of social norms for sharing, reciprocity, and equitable and long-term use of
resources, for example, in such societies is of interest for the societies themselves, as it is for scholars and
laypeople interested in sustainable economies. In order to delve into the causes of the perpetuation of social
norms of sharing and reciprocity, the second line of argumentation in this article examines the logic of
traditional communication about virtuous practices. I argue that this traditional communication is essential in
setting up the frames of reference and social preferences that we find defining the boundaries of rational choice.
While it is widely recognized in anthropology that elders and kin play a role in propagating social norms (and
so there is no “problem”), the mechanisms by which norms are successfully reproduced, even in post-colonial
contexts, are not yet fully elaborated.
This article addresses these collective-action problems from two perspectives, one evolutionary and game
theoretic, the other focusing on the semiotics of traditional communication. These are two distinct approaches in
anthropology, and are often set in almost diametrical opposition to one another. I point out the analogies and
bring them together into an integrated theory. The argument is illustrated with ethnographic examples from
northern Siberia along with a discussion of results from controlled experiments conducted there in 2003.
Bounded Rational Choice Approaches to Cooperation
One interdisciplinary approach that models the development of social norms from the bounded rational choice
perspective is the use of evolutionary game theory to simulate various cooperation problems (Henrich et al.
2004; Roth et al. 1991). The principle research question is geared to uncovering the mechanisms and strategies
used to minimize social defection and to promote cooperation. These mechanisms are discussed in game theory
and evolutionary ecology, as are ideas for why such mechanisms exist at all in the evolution of social species
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Bowles and Gintis 1998; Nowak 2005). Researchers taking this approach
commonly develop experimental scenarios, and using both human and non-human subjects (Jensen et al. 2007)
observe decision making in special contexts. Cooperation problems are often modeled as some form of social
dilemma—a scenario in which players cooperate or defect. The structure of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma
favors each player defecting (“ratting out” their partner in crime), which leads to mutual defection (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981). Other scenarios, such as the public-goods game in which participants put private tokens into a
public pot, demonstrate unexpectedly high levels of initial cooperation. Such cooperation continues, especially
where communication can help determine ground rules and trust (Ostrom 2003). It is clear from many different
experiments that human participants are initially not likely to choose the individual income-maximizing option
as predicted by a pure rational-choice model, unless no communication between subjects is allowed over
multiple rounds of experiments. The boundaries of rationality provide us assumptions and social preferences
that go beyond the utility maximizing solutions and decisions predicted by pure rational choice (Nash 1950).
Remembering the formalist-substantivist debate of the 1960s, George Dalton (1971) argued that it was a
hopeless absurdity to equate rationality with profit maximizing or materially gainful behavior, and then to expect
to find rational behavior in non-market sectors of non-Western societies.3 It is, therefore, not surprising that in
experiments in 15 societies (Henrich et al. 2006), altruistic decisions were common despite relatively low levels
of punishment. In other words, subjects contributed substantially more than they would have if their goal had
been to maximize their income. Ironically, Dalton and the substantivists are vindicated through these very
formal experiments. However, the goal of these experiments was not to look for profit maximization in nonWestern societies. The goal for using this formal technique was to determine if within-group and cross-cultural
variation in response to the games was predictable with independent variables. This variation, in turn, was to
help inform models of the psychology and evolution of cooperation.
At this point, one might ask about symbolic capital arguments, thinking that people are not going to maximize in
the short term. Considering the sensibilities of sharing and the importance of prestige, which Mauss
(1954[1925]) and Bourdieu (1977) long ago recognized in their discussions of the potlatch, maximization might
come about under the pretence of altruism. In the case of the potlatch, altruists are powerful and derive prestige
through their actions. As they draw on their social networks to accumulate goods to give away to others or
destroy in others’ presence, a leader’s beneficence both requires and accelerates the political support to act as
leader (i.e., to be respected and have a voice that is heard) in a wide range of situations. Evolutionary
economists such as Robert Frank (1988) have developed the argument further, exploring the role of reputation
in the development of moral sentiments, specifying the alternative but not mutually exclusive pathways of
“sincere-manner” and “prestige.” In both accounts people do not cheat when they know that there is a high
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likelihood of being caught. With sincere manners there are outward physical signs of trustworthiness. With the
prestige pathway, reputation is determined by communication. The symbolic capital argument is premised on
the prestige pathway for reputation building. The sincere-manner pathway has wider applicability across
societies, and may have greater significance for understanding social norms in non-hierarchical and ancient
small-scale human societies.
One of the common challenges to scholarly explanations of social norms that may help address phenomena such
as symbolic capital is the differentiation of ultimate and proximate causation. This distinction is becoming more
widely appreciated due to the development of evolutionary psychology (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). The
economic experiments by Henrich et al. (2006, 2010), as well as most evolutionary game theoretically inspired
writings (e.g., Frank 1988; Gintis 2000), are aimed at figuring out what factors or pressures present across
cultures and over time may have favored certain types of decision making or actual mental structures and
abilities that promote fairness and willingness to punish defectors. Such an approach is interested in the
ultimate, or evolutionary, causes for our decision-making abilities that are manifest as behavioral-physiological
adaptations (Henrich et al. 2006). In other words, from the evolutionary perspective one would expect the
existence of a fit between the design features of organisms and the adaptive problems that had to be solved in
the environments in which they evolved. The hypothesis of Henrich et al. (2006) is that willingness to engage in
costly punishment increases as unequal behavior increases, and that the benefit (i.e., conformity to norms) is a
social good or goal. An alternative hypothesis is that behavioral-psychological adaptations that promote favoring
in- group members and demeaning out-group members are universal evolved human tendencies that were most
likely of benefit under conditions of intergroup competition and warfare, and are necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions underlying social fairness (Yamagishi and Mifune 2009). Either way, recent experiments by
O’Gorman et al. (2008) showed that subjects have superior recall for normative social information in contrast to
non-normative formulations, adding evidence for the theory that there is an evolved cognitive architecture
relating to social norms within social groups.
These experimental approaches are quite different from historical rational-choice theories (à la Adam Smith), in
which individual decisions and actions are viewed as aggregating into social structures—the market, institutions
of monitoring and punishment— that work for the common good. In economics, rational-choice arguments
about the origin and functioning of free market institutions have been translated into utility functions that
purport to explain economic preferences and decision-making patterns all the way up to global economic
development. An example of this line of investigation has to do with how incentives work to make voluntary
contributions achieve “better” allocations of public goods (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1988). This is a proximate
model of behavior based on a decidedly Western market-oriented theory.
Proximate causation has to do with the immediate reasons (rationale, motivations, etc.) for a particular behavior.
Proximate explanations deal with the development and expression of psychological mechanisms, considering
surrounding conditions and experiences that lead to particular behaviours.4 A proximate account should also
include the frames of reference by which individuals in particular communities judge actions to be proper or
valued.
A more recent focus in some economics circles takes into consideration individuals’ social preference (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2002). Social preference is invoked to explain why people do not follow rational self-interest in
economic experiments, but rather prefer reciprocal fairness. Deviations from self-interest theory have a serious
impact on core understandings in economics. Heterogeneity in social preferences in a population results in
varied behavior in both economic games and real economic situations. This is part of a proximate explanation,
but it does not answer the question of how such variation in social preferences comes about. In addition, the
question of why we have social preferences at all—a question on the ultimate or evolutionary level—is not a
core interest of economics.
One reason to conduct game theory-based experiments in a variety of non-Western societies is to develop
models of behavior that are better informed of human variation than standard economic models. Following these
cross-cultural experiments, this article aims to provide a less ethnocentric view of human decision making by
indicating where the boundaries of rational choice are, and how social preferences come to develop the way they
do. Additional consideration could be given to a multitude of proximate mechanisms that may include, among
others, risk aversion, inequality aversion and supply and demand.
A parallel kind of proximate argument about social preferences in non-Western societies relevant when
considering economic behavior in economic experiments, and the social norms and preferences that inform it, is
prevalent in the anthropological literature of non-market societies (Woodburn 1998). Where economies are
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embedded in social and cosmological landscapes in which human and non-human persons promote personal
relationships and social goals (equality) rather than individual material gain, the result is one of restraint on
individual agency. This kind of evidence has more to do with the social context upon which decision making is
predicated, and is developed as a semiotic approach in this article. This article’s major methodological concern
is how to synthesize the bounded rational choice and semiotic approaches on the proximate level.
As an example of one such synthesis, Polly Wiessner (2005) recently analyzed 308 conversations she recorded
among Ju/’hoansi Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert to find out if altruistic rewarding and punishing in discourse
plays a role in social norm enforcement. After extensive analysis of the outcomes of communication about
disputes (from “communication of the message” up to “ostracism” and “violence”), Wiessner (2005: 139) found
that “individuals obeyed the norm and punished its violators, even when this costly behavior could not be
justified in terms of immediate selfish preferences.” The long-term benefits of costly punishment are likely to be
found in the fact that the Ju/’hoansi live in “stable, cooperative, and harmonious groups” (Wiessner 2005: 139).
In Wiessner’s article, a synthesis is accomplished via: 1) analysis of real discourse and behavioral outcomes in
terms of proximate causes, such as costly punishment, and 2) the evolutionary rationale of the mechanisms
behind the selection and maintenance of such proximate mechanisms.
A similar but slightly different synthesis is proposed here. The analysis of real discourse from Siberia is
preliminary and oriented toward proximate causality. The empirical results from experimental games are
contextualized with the consideration of frames of reference and social norms promoted within traditional
discourse. How such mechanisms and processes make sense in terms of the evolution of cooperation is also
considered.
Semiotic Approaches to Sharing in Non-Market Societies
One of the major interests in modern social anthropology is the maintenance of indigenous social norms in the
context of colonialization and globalization (Barnard 2004). Explaining continuity in local practices (especially
communal resource management regimes) of small- scale groups that are in contact with, or have been
incorporated into, bureaucratic societies is an issue of theoretical significance for many anthropologists and of
practical importance to indigenous groups. Continuities in social norms are usually attributed either to structural
aspects of the larger social system or to individual agency.5 This, however, is a false dichotomy. Communal
property, generosity and mutual aid have been observed in subsistence production societies across time and
geographic areas (Barnard 2002, 2004), and many indigenous peoples are returning to, or defending, these
communal traditions in the present (e.g., Fondahl et al. 2000) illustrating both structural constraints/openings
and the effects of agency.
Nicholas Peterson (2002) suggests that social-economic continuities among native peoples are reproduced at a
basic level through systems of social access to the means of survival. Peterson proposes the concept of the
“domestic moral economy,” building on his own concept of “demand sharing” with certain parallels to Sahlins’s
(1972) domestic mode of production and Scott’s (1976) moral economy. In Peterson’s perspective,
infrastructure (kinship) and superstructure (moral economy) work in concert to perpetuate practices such as
sharing.6
Alan Barnard (2002) proposes a further shift away from explanations focusing on mode of production (i.e.,
utilities), and proposes a heuristic based on the concepts of the “foraging mode of thought” and “accumulation
mode of thought.” In Barnard’s argument, standards and values in the different modes of thought are clearly
dichotomous. For example, among non-foraging peoples accumulation of wealth is considered to be “social”
while immediate consumption is “antisocial.” Among foragers, the opposite obtains: accumulation is
“antisocial” and immediate consumption is “social.” Such values constrain or inform social behavior in each
type of society to create continuities despite changes in mode of production. Barnard’s work reintegrates the
moral aspects of economy into the realm of political economy by pointing out the ideological limits and
constraints on individual agency, but the heuristic does not explain how the ideologies are generated. In this
respect, Barnard’s heuristic suffers from the same problems as other structural approaches.
Thomas Widlok (2002) connects the dots between individual agency and ideological structure by focusing on
virtue and virtuous practice, and developing a set of related terms to be applied across diverse cases and
apparently dichotomous ethical-economic systems (“moral” through “political” economies). For Widlok, it is
theoretically more productive “to focus on social agency and social relations instead of cultural rules” (2002:
13). This perspective follows Ingold’s (2000) point that the “total field of relations in which individuals are
situated guides the formation ofindividuals’ skill and virtues. Unlike consequentialist theories that judge the
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rightness or wrongness of an action based on the consequences that action has (e.g., utilitarianism), Widlok
attempts to develop a non-consequentialist theory in which rightness or wrongness of actions is judged on the
properties intrinsic to the action, not on the consequences. Widlok’s basic set of related theoretical terms are
“action,” “goal” (i.e., circumstantial good), “benefit” (i.e., classified good), and “good.” His argument focuses
on how goods, goals, and benefits are communicated and demonstrated in practice. The use of such concepts
brings this approach frightfully close to consequentialist/utilitarian approaches. Widlok even concedes that the
“sequence “goal-practice-benefit” is reminiscent [of] idealized rational decision making which also governs
exchange” (2002: 27). Although this terminological duplication opens a possible critique of Widlok’s nonconsequentialist ambitions, I argue that the duplication demonstrates the need to synthesize bounded rational
choice and semiotic approaches, as it shows how structures can be generated, especially those that support the
norms for social/public goods.
As examples of this approach, Widlok compares his contrasting fieldwork experiences among the Hai//om
Bushmen of Namibia and Kimberly region Australian Aborigines. Among Hai//om, Widlok discusses the view
that sharing land and food are benefits and social goods. The practice, common in the area, is to grant access to
land, much as Barnard (2002) suggests for foragers in general. Among the Aborigines, by contrast, Widlok
explains that access to land is more goal-oriented (e.g., making a successful land claim) and highly restricted by
the Aborigines themselves, in addition to a series of governmental and non-governmental gatekeepers. In this
case, it is the goal of restriction (exclusion) that makes it virtuous. Widlok differentiates a number of facets of
virtuous practice, focusing on the interplay between the use of the moral dimension and actions related to
access (property). He shows how goods, goals, and benefits are used as examples of virtuous practice, leading to
the development of what might be termed ideology when it becomes sufficiently standardized. Widlok admits
that the “terms ‘goods,’ ‘benefits,’ and ‘goals’ are not new … [and] … have been applied in micro-scale studies
of individual subjects in (largely artificial) decision making and dilemma setting (as in psychology and part of
economics)” (2002: 22). Again, this duplication could be turned toward the synthesis argued for in this article.
The key to Widlok’s argument differentiating the non- consequentialist theory of social norms is his point,
following Gell (1998), that goals, benefits and goods are “abducted” from virtuous practice in real behavioural
settings. But what is abduction?
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, a great logician of the nineteenth century and father of semiotics,
argued that in addition to deductive, or necessary inferences, there are two utterly distinct classes of probable
inferences: inductive inferences and abductive inferences, which he also called “retroductive” inferences.7 An
inference—best known in the form of a syllogism—consists of two premises constituting the antecedent of the
inference, from which a consequent can be causally inferred by implication.
In a deductive (demonstrative) inference the consequent is derived from the antecedent and the result is
necessarily true: “All balls in this urn are red (the rule); all balls in this particular sample are taken from this
urn (the case); therefore, all balls in this particular random sample are red (the result)” (Burch 2010).
Deductive arguments usually begin with a major premise (a rule), state a minor premise (a case of that rule), and
infer the conclusion (or result). The sign “>” is used to represent the inference (see Paavola 2004: 252).
There is evidence that the human mind is suited to a particular type of deductive inference. Evolutionary
psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1989) demonstrated that subjects understood and correctly
applied the deductive process—in the form of the Wason selection task—with significantly greater reliability
when the rule “If P, then Q” was contextualized as a social exchange scenario. Such selection tasks are often
found in descriptive or abstract forms on standardized college entrance exams where a test taker is to pick an
option that needs to be checked in order to see if a rule was violated. The improved results for social exchange
contexts stood even when Tooby and Cosmides used unfamiliar rules, such as, “If a man eats cassava root, then
he has a tattoo on his face” (e.g., “If you take the benefit, then you have fulfilled the requirement”). When
people defect on a social exchange they are taking a benefit without fulfilling a requirement. In this case,
defection means eating cassava root when not tattooed (i.e., if P, but not-Q). Checking the not-P (not eating
cassava) and Q options (tattooed face) are obviously not necessary to see if the rule is violated. Tooby and
Cosmides (1992) explain the high performance on the contextualized Wason selection task (i.e., checking the P
and not-Q options) as the result of a “look for cheaters” psychological mechanism. Further, Tooby and
Cosmides argue that such universal cognitive architecture is the result the importance of social exchange over a
significant fraction of hominid evolutionary history. To illustrate their point, Cosmides and Tooby (1989: 92)
show that adult subjects, and standardized test takers, are generally not good at Wason selection tasks that are
descriptive or based on permission rules. An example is the rule, “If a person has a ‘D’ rating, then his
documents must be coded ‘3.’” According to their argument, humans are not good at abstract logic that has no
social contract context. Presumably, according to this ultimate (evolutionary) argument, the social contract
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context was a significant enough selection pressure (i.e., benefits of cooperation vs. costs/risks of social
exchange with cheaters) among our ancestors that specialized decision-making abilities were selected for, and
these have been maintained throughout human history along with the importance of social exchange. An
appreciation of this evolutionary background of the psychology of social exchange is relevant for the discussion
here, as our logical capabilities are not determined culturally, but are efficient with regard to particular social
problems, namely social defection.
Although the deductive abilities relative to cheating on social exchange address the “free-rider” problem, they
do not address the question of the role of agency in the creation of social norms. This is where nondemonstrative inferences come into play. Compared to deduction, abduction is a “synthetic inference” where the
antecedent is affirmed from the consequent (Gell 1998: 13–14). In other words, abductive inferences switch the
case with the result (Rule & Result > Case). Paavola (2004) likens abduction to hypothesis formation. An
example of abduction using the same concepts would read: “All balls in this urn are red; all balls in this
particular random sample are red; therefore, all balls in this particular sample are taken from this urn”
(abduction). Abduction leaves open the possibility that a smiling person cannot or will not be friendly, and thus
requires faith that the smile is a good index of friendliness. Gell (1998: 13–14), building on ideas developed by
Peirce, states that an index is “a ‘natural sign,’ that is, an entity from which an observer can make a causal
inference of some kind, or an inference about the intentions or capabilities of another person.” Indexes are
signs the meaning of which can be abductively inferred. Further, Gell (1998: 14), citing Boyer (1994: 147),
points out that abduction is a basic mechanism that allows people to constrain the possible number of
explanations compatible with any event. This is a suggestion for the hypothetical adaptive significance of the
abduction ability in the human psyche. Unfortunately, there is scant reference to abduction per se in the
evolutionary psychology literature in comparison to the deductive process. Gerrans (2002: 311), citing Bloom
and German (2000), makes reference to “a global cognitive capacity for abduction and inductive confirmation.”
Bloom and German do not mention abduction by name but mention “a sophisticated ability to reason about the
mental states” (2000: B29). The approach taken below is much more descriptive and exploratory than that
which would be taken by evolutionary psychology; however, controlled studies on abduction could be a
potentially fruitful area of study.
Induction—the second, and more familiar, type of non-demonstrative (probable) inference—makes observations
into theories, taking the deductive syllogism and interchanging the result with the rule (Case & Result > Rule)
to produce: “all balls in this particular random sample are red ; all balls in this particular sample are taken
from this urn; therefore All balls in this urn are red.” This is the rule-building process for a descriptive rule. As
we all know, smiles can be deceptive, but as a general theory to be tested, the inductive inference is a good start.
There is good evidence from psychology that inductive skills in the form of probability judgments are also
improved by contextualization (Blok et al. 2007).
Ethnographic Context
Fieldwork Experience
My fieldwork in Ust’-Avam totaled 30 months between January 1994 and March 2003. I spent an additional 18
months in the regional capital and three small communities in the Taimyr Autonomous region, beginning in
1992. I conducted dictator and ultimatum games in Ust’-Avam in 2003. The long-term nature of my research in
the community and familiarity with many households helped to build acceptance of the experimental games,
and contributed to the overall success of the experiments. A number of participants regretted that such games
were not a regular social event sponsored by the village. In addition, my fieldwork in the community allowed
me to identify a variety of interesting local explanations of events (ranging from good hunting fortune to
untimely deaths) that provide examples of non- demonstrative inferences from social exchange rules.
Ust’-Avam is 250 kilometers from Norilsk, the largest city in the Taimyr and a vast mining and metallurgy
center. As Ust’-Avam is one of the closest native villages to Norilsk, it was selected as the site for the
establishment of a gospromkhoz (government hunting enterprise) in 1971, known as GPKh Taimyrskii. This
would ultimately have a profound economic impact on the village. The people of Ust’-Avam have a mixed
subsistence economy in which hunting, fishing and trapping form the basis of food production and distribution,
while salaried work contributes to the ability to purchase consumer goods and services.8
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The Importance of Common Pool Resources in Ust’-Avam
My ethnographic studies among the Dolgans and the Nganasans during the 1990s (Ziker 2002) described the
increased importance of the local subsistence economy following the collapse of the Soviet planned economy in
1991. The costs of transportation have increased dramatically, and now only the most essential goods and fuel
are shipped to the community. Occasionally helicopters are sent to the community for medical emergencies or
the transportation of teachers. The helicopter most often used is the Mi-8, which can hold 20 passengers or up
to three tons of cargo (for example, 50 reindeer carcasses). During my first visit to the region in 1992, flights
were scheduled three times per week and cost less than US$20. Now a one-way ticket costs approximately
US$250 per individual plus baggage (1 percent of the ticket price for each additional kilogram exceeding 20
kilograms). The stated income of most participants in the 2003 experimental study ranged from US$0 to
US$5,516 annually, with a mean of US$1,256 for all participants.
Alongside the economic depression and emergent subsistence economy in remote communities since the early
1990s, presidential decrees and regional edicts favored a variety of forms of property in the region. “Familyclan” holdings were ostensibly ordered as an immediate measure for protecting the economic independence of
the indigenous people. In 2003, 163 enterprises were registered, according to a regional report. Previous
archival research of 140 land allotments granted between 1992 and 1997 (48 of which were registered to
indigenous residents) showed that most are located in close proximity to either the regional capital (Dudinka) or
Norilsk, or along the Enisei River (Ziker 2003). Those people living in native communities at a distance from
Dudinka, such as Ust’-Avam, and in remote isolated houses across the tundra, were less likely to make formal
land claims. The Avam tundra has 1 registered “family-clan” holding out of 21 named hunting territories
(assigned to sets of hunters, or “brigades,” during the Soviet times). The territory of the one holding is rarely
used because it is distant from the village. The remaining 20 territories are ostensibly held by former brigade
members and are mainly used for subsistence activities. Informal means of regulating access to and distribution
of resources were documented in the community. Relevant to the informal property system are the altruistic
social norms.
Surrounding the village, the common-pool hunting and fishing territory (liubitel’skoe ugod’e) became more
important as hunters and other workers were laid off in the 1990s. The borders between the common-pool
territory and assigned hunting territories have become increasingly flexible and porous since the cessation of
planned hunts in 1993. Cooperative economic activities, such as joint fishing, reindeer hunting, hauling and
travelling, keep alive the time-honored tradition of “mutual aid” (Barnard 2004). As machinery became hard to
replace, hunters began traveling more often on foot or on skis, and individuals needed to work out among
themselves where they would be “sitting” for a season or trip. Extremely distant territories, more than 150
kilometers from the village and not located on major waterways, have fallen into disuse. Traditional
management strategies in the Avam tundra address the classic collective-action problem: how to identify and
exclude those who do not contribute to the provisioning or viability of critical resources. Without the ability to
exclude those who degrade a resource, future communal use is placed in jeopardy. Resource distribution is
controlled by and targeted at specific individuals and families. Elders and wives are the most common recipients
of food. They usually have the acknowledged responsibility to redistribute it again to others, and often hold the
keys to storage closets and sheds. In Ust’-Avam, social boundaries and permission requirements are used to
reject individuals who have taken an extractive or abusive approach to resources in the area. These actions are
justified through communication and acceptance of inferences from social exchange rules discussed below.
Methods
The Experimental Background
The ultimatum game and the dictator game were administered in Ust’-Avam during a January–March 2003 field
trip sponsored by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. The player information sheets and game
scripts from a U.S. National Science Foundation project9 were translated into Russian with the assistance of
local Russian speakers and checked for accuracy with local assistants. The village administration supplied
complete census information for the community as of 2002, including household affiliation, in the form of a
numbered list. There were 163 households in the community. One adult was chosen from every third household
on the list in order to arrive at a representative sample. Some people were not present, so several additional
adults were recruited, first from the selected household if possible, or from the adjacent household on the list if
no one from the selected household was available. One player was hard of hearing, and could not understand the
instructions, so was sent home. Thus there were 59 players in the sample, all of whom understood Russian (the
language in which the experiment was conducted). The director of the village school agreed to let me use
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several rooms on a Saturday and Sunday for the games. Two teachers and their husbands, all of whom are
representatives of the local indigenous population, agreed to be research assistants. Basic socio-demographic
background data sheets used across 15 fieldsites (Ensminger and Henrich 2014) were filled out with the
assistance of the research assistants. One research assistant agreed to read the script to each of three groups,
while her husband conducted the individual games in a smaller room, and I filled in player data forms
recording individual decisions in the games. We videotaped several hours of the process. Summaries of the
games follow.
The Dictator Game
In this scenario, there are two players. Player 1 is allotted a sum of money. In this case, it was 100 rubles
(approximately US$3.30). Player 1 is asked to divide the money, and to give any amount from zero to the full
amount in 10 percent increments to an unknown Player 2 from the subject pool. Player 2 is not allowed to reject
the offer; hence Player 1 is a “dictator.” This “game” is essentially a one-sided and graduated social dilemma,
and the results are thought to provide an estimate of the baseline generosity (trust) of participants in the subject
pool, since there is no consequence if Player 1 maximizes his or her winnings by allotting nothing to Player 2.
The Ultimatum Game
The ultimatum game is similar to the dictator game, except that Player 2 may reject Player 1’s offer. It is
essentially a one-shot social exchange problem. Players are told that if Player 1’s offer is rejected when the
anonymous participants are matched at the end of the session, then neither player wins any money; hence the
ultimatum is a punishment costly to both players. Before hearing Player 1’s offer and in order to determine the
results for all possible offers, Player 2 states whether or not he or she would accept each of the possible offers
(in 10 percent increments) an anonymous Player 1 might make. The lowest amount that Player 2 will accept is
the minimal acceptable offer (MAO), which is used in aggregate to estimate the population’s willingness to
punish unfair offers at their own expense.
Results
Experimental Results and Variables: Dictator Game
Overall, in the Ust’-Avam dictator games (DG) the mean offer was 37.3 percent of the stake, and the mode, or
most frequent offer, was 50 percent. However, the second most frequent offer was 10 percent. The distribution
of the data from Ust’-Avam suggests a high level of generosity by most, and a lower level of generosity (and
tendency toward income maximization) for a minority.10 The degree to which individual players had
involvement in the larger economy gives equivocal information because, on the one hand, access to cash
positively affected Player 1 offers while, on the other hand, the number of wealth items listed by Players 1
negatively affected offers. Players’ individual cash income variable was the strongest predictor of dictator game
offers in Ust’-Avam: those participants acting in the capacity of Player 1 who had lower average incomes ended
up making lower offers, while those with higher incomes made higher offers in the game. Sources of income in
Ust’-Avam included, for example, pensions, single-mother payments, and salaries from employment in the
school or other service sectors, as reported on the player information sheets. This relationship suggests that the
greater the involvement in the larger economy, the closer offers approached 50 percent (i.e., “fair”). Eighty
percent of participants made significantly higher offers than would be predicted by rational-choice theory,
which predicts offers close to zero percent.
Micro-social conditions, specifically household size, influenced dictator game offers. Participants from larger
households were less generous, possibly because they perceived greater need for every kopek, or perhaps
because they would normally share with more individuals on a daily basis and they therefore take as much as
they can get when given the opportunity. A similar negative relationship to offers was found in dictator game
experiments among undergraduate college students at Boise State University in 2005, where a statistically
suggestive trend showed those living in larger households and with more non-kin roommates made lower offers
in the dictator game (Ziker et al. 2006). The possibility that household size affects offers in similar ways across
cultures is intriguing and suggests an influence of social factors on calibrating human psychology.
Wealth was negatively related to dictator game offers in Ust’-Avam, but statistically this was a weak finding.
Wealth was estimated as a raw count of material items, such as snowmobiles, boats, motors, firearms, and
sewing machines, listed on the player data sheet. A confounding issue is the fact that most individuals
accumulated wealth items during the Soviet era, when such items were more plentiful and accessible to hunters
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and their families through mail order and the state enterprise. The correlation between wealth and lower dictator
game offers suggests that people who had a more selfish disposition were more likely to have accumulated
durable goods in Soviet times (based on ethnographic observations over a decade). It therefore makes sense that
raw counts of wealth items did not correlate with income in 2003. Other variables investigated across these
experimental economic studies, including age, sex, years of education, and five other market-integration
variables, were not significant in regressions of dictator game offers in Ust’-Avam. The number of examples
given to the respondent in the individual round was related positively to offers, suggesting that those who
needed practice to demonstrate their understanding of the zero-sum implications of their decisions trended
toward equitable divisions.
Experimental Results and Variables: Ultimatum Game
The most frequent ultimatum game offer in Ust’-Avam (made by close to 60 percent of Players 1) was 50:50;
average offers were slightly lower (48 percent). Mean offers hovering around 40 percent in the ultimatum game
(UG) with the mode at the 50:50 split is characteristic of studies of university students and Western societies
(Oosterbeek et al. 2004). Mean and modal offers in Ust’-Avam were in the middle of the range of findings by
Henrich et al. (2004) for a variety of non-western societies. In Ust’-Avam, 15 percent of the ultimatum game
offers were 20 percent or less. Seven percent of the UG offers were 60 percent or more. With a single mode at
50 percent, the results had a normal distribution. Nonetheless, there were no independent variables that predicted
ultimatum game offers except a very weak positive correlation to DG offers—similar to other cases in the crosscultural data (Jean Ensminger, personal communication). It might be hypothesized that in the UG scenario there
is enough apprehension about the possibility of rejection (and loss of all possible winnings) to channel players’
allocation decisions to even splits.
Exploring participants’ willingness to punish unfair offers, Players 2 were asked to respond to each potential
offer (from zero to 100 percent) they could have received from Player 1 in the UG. This information provides
data for identifying each individual’s MAO. The MAO provides a glimpse into the perspective of individuals on
the receiving end of this social exchange scenario. The average MAO for the Ust’-Avam experiments was 16.6
percent of the stake (number of Players 2 = 29). For comparison, the average MAO for 2005 experiments at
Boise State University was 25.5 percent (number of Players 2 = 11). Kahneman et al. (1986: S291) report
average MAO of 25.9 percent in experiments with psychology students at the University of British Columbia.
The MAOs in Ust’-Avam are significantly lower than those found in these Western settings, indicating less of a
concern for even splits by Players 2. This result indicates that people in Ust’-Avam expect generosity without
the need for high degrees of punishment. In other words they appear less vindictive in this experimental setting.
Household size was negatively related to MAOs. In other words, individuals in larger households were willing
to accept lower offers. This might be due to the fact that people in larger households share with a larger number
of people on a daily basis, and this reflects the likelihood that they will accept smaller portions of collective pies
regularly. Remember that household size affected offers in the dictator game, so that individuals living in larger
households made smaller offers. This is an interesting parallel, indicating parties on both sides of the experiment
have applied similar social norms. Age is not correlated with household size, so these variables do not appear to
be covariates.11
Overall, with the ultimatum game, Player 1 offers were highly geared toward fairness, but rejection rates were
relatively low and income maximization for Player 1 would have occurred at 10 percent (Henrich et al. 2006).
Players were offering more than they could have without risking punishment. This arguably represents a high
degree of pro-sociality in the community which conforms to the ethnographic data on food sharing, land use,
and world view (Ziker 2002).
Interpretation of Experimental Results
If one assumes the strong definition of rational choice, the experimental results in Ust’-Avam echo those of
other societies where individuals appear to be making suboptimal decisions— they are not maximizing when
they could especially considering that rejection levels (MAOs) are relatively low. This suggests that social
norms for equity are consistent in Ust’-Avam and applied in this experimental context, and that direct tit-for-tat
punishment is not used as consistently in the UG experiment as it is by players in Western market-based
societies where rejection rates are usually high. The fact that player income in Ust’-Avam affected offers
suggests that integration with the greater economy increases equitable decisions both here and in experiments
other societies (Henrich et al. 2004: 32; Henrich et al. 2010). Integration with the larger economy itself could
encourage expectations for equitable divisions in these experiments because of institutional concern for fairness
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and the occurrence of tat-for-tat reciprocity, which in larger economies could translate into consumers making
alternative future choices (Frank 1988: 174; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The expectation is present on both sides
of the social exchange, and this is reflected in high offers by Players 1 and high acceptance of low offers by
Players 2. In Ust’-Avam there is an expectation of fairness, but the willingness to punish is less than that found
in Western societies and communities with greater market participation. The low incidence of low offers in the
ultimatum game and moderate levels of punishment that occurred in Ust’-Avam may reflect the goals and values
propagated in the subsistence hunting economy, with its common-pool territories, common sharing with kin and
sense of entitlements to aid for community members.
Micro-social contexts and independent attributes of players, such as attendance at religious services—with a
positive effect on DG offers just out of range of statistical significance—also affected decisions in the games in
Siberia. Increased household size was related to both lower offers by Player 1 in the DG and lower minimal
acceptable offers from Player 2 in the UG.
These micro-social factors suggest that there are life-cycle related sources of variability in economic behavior
and local social norms, a finding that is supported by early economic and processual anthropological research
showing that life-cycle variability is related to household size (Fortes 1958; Sahlins 1972). One anecdotal bit of
evidence of life- cycle variability relating to social norms in Ust’-Avam surrounds taboos expressed by elders.
In the early 1990s I observed younger adults expressing disbelief at some taboos; however, when they later
became parents, they used similar rhetorical devices to direct their own children’s behavior. This acceptance of
what is offered—rather than a heightened concern for equity—may qualify as a virtuous practice in larger
households in Ust’-Avam. Such practice is isomorphic with philosophies of this and other hunting-and-gathering
societies where the environment is viewed as a giving entity, but it raises intriguing question: How is it possible
to explain the high degree of pro-sociality found in hunting and gathering societies without the heavy reliance
on punishment?
Non-Demonstrative Inferences and Social Norms
A number of aphorisms, cosmological concepts, and ideas about the relationship between humans and their
environment are prevalent in Siberia among the Dolgans and the Nganasans, and across indigenous peoples in
the circumpolar North. An example from Ust’- Avam is the “law of the tundra,” a multifaceted social contract
between the people and the spirits of the tundra, containing admonitions for mistreating flora and fauna and
prescriptions to help others. The goods, goals, and benefits to community members are abducted from virtuous
practices or stories of virtuous and unvirtuous practices indexed as the “law of the tundra.” These ideas are
repeated by elders and others in the community in a variety of contexts (see, e.g., Ziker 2002: 111–115 for
Oksye’s story of the reindeer herder falling into the Underground Kingdom because he took his family away
from other Dolgans). Ziker (2003) discusses the implications of some of these concepts for property relations in
Taimyr, as does Anderson (2000). A series of adages related specifically to food sharing is discussed in Ziker
(2007) and Ziker and Schnegg (2005).
An example of the link between non-demonstrative inference and social norm establishment is the relationship
between discussions of hunting/fishing practices and the social good of resource conservation among the
Dolgans and the Nganasans in Ust’-Avam. Many hunters in Ust’-Avam mentioned to me that they wanted the
animals to be healthy and to reproduce for their children’s future hunting and fishing. They explained some of
their hunting and fishing techniques as satisfying this social goal of conservation, for example letting the
majority of a herd (tabun) of wild reindeer (dikie) pass before starting to shoot. Beyond the obvious proximate
goals of hunting and fishing to provide benefits for family and community, long-term conservation is seen as a
good resulting from this virtuous practice.
People and events are discussed in light of such expectations about virtuous practices using abductive inferences
(Rule and Result > Case). A formalized example with a switched social contract rule (“If I satisfy the
requirement, then I take the benefit”) would sound like: “If hunters treat animals with proper respect and
intensity, then the animals will return (Rule); these animals returned (Result); therefore, the hunter treated the
animals respectfully (Case).” Statements about treating animals with respect during hunting, butchery and
distribution so that they will return are common in Ust’-Avam. Such discussions are indicative of the social
contract that people have with animals through the “law of the tundra.” Ideas about social relationships with
animals are widespread across the circumpolar North. For example, for the Cree of Canada relationships with
animal-spirit bosses (SDZƗNDQ) and prey are fundamental to their philosophy (Brightman 1993: 93, 187). It is
my contention that abductive inferences from such social exchange rules are communicated to affirm the
virtuous practices of individuals in the community, thus “reproducing” social norms.
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A specific example from Ust’-Avam is a situation in the 1990s when gospromkhoz plans for rock ptarmigan
(kuropatka) were canceled. In the 1970s and 1980s hunters were rewarded with new snowmobiles from the
gospromkhoz if 1,500 rock ptarmigan were turned in. Good hunters shot kuropatka with small calibre (5.62 mm)
rifles. According to one Dolgan hunter discussing rock ptarmigan hunting and trapping, plenty of the birds
circulated when hunters paid attention to them, even with the intention of hunting them. This was how they
“fulfilled the requirement” of showing the requisite respect for and interest in the birds. During Soviet times, the
birds were treated with the right amount of respect and interest, and thus the hunting was a virtuous practice. In
the 1990s, after state-sponsored hunting collapsed and this incentive program was abandoned, people stopped
hunting rock ptarmigan and the birds mysteriously disappeared. The reason given to me for their disappearance
was that hunters stopped paying attention to the birds (i.e., the requirement was not satisfied). If one gives
credence to the abductive inference above, the statement makes perfect sense because the animals did not return
and we know that the birds were not treated with proper respect and hunting intensity (i.e., they were ignored).
More recently, when food has been short in the spring, young hunters have been setting up snares in a series of
routes (trap lines) in riparian areas within walking distance of the village. These hunters have been successfully
bringing home rock ptarmigan almost every time they check their traps. Rock ptarmigan are again being paid
attention to and so they have returned in good numbers. This narrative shows that people in the community
perceive and communicate their relationships with the environment, and their understanding of their role in the
local ecological system, and that a certain amount of hunting is more virtuous than not hunting at all. A
deductive interpretation, of course, is that when people are not hunting, they are less likely to notice the birds,
so it would seem like there are fewer birds around.
In this light, specific events are discussed and interpreted in the community as evidence of the deviation from
virtuous practice. Traditional rules that promote adherence to social norms are likely developed (induced) in this
way: a hunter is known for overhunting, or the improper non-virtuous use of resources on his territory: one of
the hunter’s relatives (or the hunter himself) dies prematurely following the improper behavior. This premature
death can become associated with the hunter’s actions in the tundra to induce a rule: if people hunt without
proper respect and intensity, that is without virtue, people may die as a result of supernatural retribution. The
death is associated with the hunter’s non-virtuous use of resources through inductive inference. In reality, such
cases and results are discussed and debated within the community, and narratives are established which embed
the event in a wider social logic that bolsters social norms. When the non-demonstrative inference is promoted
by elders and accepted by middle-aged and younger people, then that acceptance is a reaffirmation of the
community’s traditional authority functioning to promote social norms, goods and goals. The proximate benefits
(i.e., social cohesion or protection of ecological balance) of these social goods and goals are promoted through
abduction to specific cases. The goods and goals are abducted from rules about virtuous practice; the rules
themselves are developed through induction.
Another example of an abductive inference shows how elders typically use this form of logic to index the
attributes of others, particularly youth, and to influence the behavior of younger generations. The context of this
example is from a conversation between some middle-aged friends discussing the capacities of one of the many
grandchildren in the presence of elders and other grandchildren: being quick (shustryi) is an important quality of
being a good hunter (Rule); K. is a quick boy (shustryi mal’chik) (Result); therefore, K. will be a good hunter
(Case). The case is inferred (abducted) from the rule, given a specific result. Such a statement has the tenor of a
deductive prediction. However, this “prediction” is based on the logical fallacy of affirming the antecedent from
the consequent and yielding conclusions that are not necessarily true. In contrast, a deductive inference would
run: good hunters are quick; K. is a good hunter, therefore, K. is quick.
Many of the aphorisms, concepts, and identities that are characteristic of Dolgan and Nganasan social
organization are ecological or relational in nature, but some directly deal with personal relationships. For
example, Gracheva (1983: 52) uses the etymology of the Nganasan word for “life”–a complex set of concepts
meaning “life continuing itself, sometimes called together (arranged), and placed”—to illustrate these
relationships. The life force, or nilymty, extends beyond the person. It is in all objects and essences the person
touches or connects with, such as clothes, smells, names, inspiration, speech, songs, dances, actions, foraging
trails, housing and children. The connections are like unseen threads. Even if humans are not monitoring social
contracts, the implication is that spiritual forces are monitoring human action.
In one of Gracheva’s examples, a man finds a stone in the stomach of a fish he has caught. This unusual event is
taken to mean that the Sea-Mother “selected” him, and sent him her “hypostasis,” or essential substance, her
“child, which is continuously connected with her” (Gracheva 1983:54). The hunter takes the stone home and it
is seen as a good omen. He and his family members dress the stone in clothing that his wife sews, which
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provides a direct connection to her. The stone is fed, carried along in a special sled, and covered with furs. This
“child” is next to the hunter and his family, sharing with them its life, although it has an independent existence.
The family members talk with the stone, rouse it from sleep by the careful tap of a ceremonial stick, and convey
their requests to it. If they have the impression that the stone is not helping them in fishing, ignoring the stone
would only make matters worse because it connects the owners with the Sea-Mother. They can leave it with
someone for safe keeping, but to give it away would have potent consequences. The very best situation would
be for someone to ask for it, and for the owner to decide to give it to the person who requested it; in that case the
hypostatis itself expresses the desire to go to another hunter. The Nganasan concepts of nature and person show
us the importance of fictive kinship, where the people conceptualize their connections with the environment and
follow the consequences of their actions with regard to it. The ultimate owner is the Sea-Mother, and the people
are allowed to possess resources as long as they treat them correctly, which includes the virtuous practice of
sharing, symbolized by the care of the child adopted from the Sea-Mother.
Food and other resources from the tundra are distributed widely through social networks within the Ust’-Avam
community. A number of hunters stated to me that if they did not give food to other people, then successful
hunting in the future would be jeopardized. “It is that kind of nature,” said one hunter. Greed does not pay, in
other words, and sharing with others is adduced as proper and moral social benefit. Many types of people are
included in the distribution networks: relatives, friends, pensioners, single mothers and other people who
request help. Because of the distribution of raw food products, accumulation is socially limited. Virtuous
practice of sharing food (both raw and cooked) is abducted from the rule that correct treatment of animals (i.e.,
sharing the meat) brings on continued luck in hunting. These ideas have important implications for the moral
dimension of cooperation and resource use because, where there are threads, actions can be traced back to
individuals’ actions. Inductive and abductive inferences, therefore, are used to compare actions and statements to
virtuous practices in emphasizing goods and benefits for the community, rather than individual goals and
actions. When everything a person touches is connected back to him or her, autonomous, individual action is in
fact bounded.
Summary and Conclusion
Rational choice and semiotic approaches provide complementary explanations pointing in the same direction.
Non-market based norms of sharing and reciprocity are stable in a small-scale society, even where altruistic
punishment is less intense and people are more accepting of unfair divisions of a stake. The stability of such
norms of sharing and reciprocity obtains through the widespread use of non-demonstrative inferences and a
degree of costly enforcement (people with more offspring were less willing to accept low offers), although not
as prevalent as in Western societies. Such inferences highlight social goods and associate antisocial behavior
through real and mytho-historical rites of passage and tragedies. A weakness in using these two very different
forms of analysis is no direct causal linkage between the use of non-demonstrative inferences in daily
communication and the high baseline generosity and relative willingness to accept low offers in the
experimental games. The results of the games are more in line with an index of social norms, rather than any
kind of measurement of real behavior.
Experimental results indicate high basic levels of altruism in societies with strong subsistence economies such
as the Dolgan and the Nganasan societies. This is demonstrated by a wide gap between minimal acceptable
offers and modal offers in the ultimatum games, meaning that people are more altruistic than need be, but also
that the expectation for fairness is relatively low. Where integration with the larger economy is greater, such as
in many Western societies, the expectations for fairness are also greater. This relationship is counter- intuitive
in that one might expect that greater experience with the larger economy would cause people to be more selfish.
In fact, the results of this study and others in the NSF project (Henrich et al. 2010) indicate that experience with
the larger economy encourages fairness, because players intuitively know that other players will not accept low
offers. (This could be interpreted as a form of selfishness.) Such reciprocal fairness is indicative of social
preferences defined by experiences in larger-scale societies. Information on players’ households demonstrated
that personal living situations affect generosity in these experiments. These results repeat the findings of
Henrich et al. (2004) for fifteen small-scale societies. Some structural and material factors, thus, have been
shown to influence sharing patterns across cultures (i.e., individuals with certain attributes appear to be more
altruistic in promotion of social norms).
Abduction and induction, as discursive strategies, are used to set limits on agency in Ust’-Avam, and it can be
argued that they are used for that purpose everywhere in human societies, although the exact tenor of social
preferences can vary (from more altruistic to more reciprocal fairness). Non-demonstrative inferences are
probability statements (Carnap 1946). When acceptance of such statements is communicated without
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skepticism, people communicate something: respect for, agreement with, or a positive association with the
speaker of the non-demonstrative inference. Such inferences can be used to put into effect cooperation through a
sincere-manner pathway: probability statements about the reality of cosmological reckoning in social contracts,
followed by the communicated acceptance of such statements by others in the community. Induction is the
development of theories and rules on the basis of observation. Abduction is the process of hypothesis
generation—taking rules and results with the goal of explaining cases. Using both forms of communication, a
speaker can develop rules or explain events that illustrate virtuous practices, and, in the context of social
exchange rules, reproduce social norms for kin-like altruism within the community.
Ethnographic study among the Dolgans and the Nganasans during the 1990s (Ziker 2002) described the
increased importance of the local subsistence economy after the collapse of the Soviet planned economy. The
development of communal social organizations, common-pool resources, and heightened non-market exchange
during the post-socialist period appears to promote social goals of equity that subvert individual goals. A closer
analysis shows that traditional communication about virtuous practices and social norms sets the frames of
reckoning with regard to individual behavior and its rationality. Individual actions that emphasize social goals
and public goods to the extent they do among the Dolgans and the Nganasans may appear suboptimal in the
context of pure rational choice and free- market global economies, but are entirely within the bounds of
rationality in this social context that individuals create and recreate every day.
Arguments and Synthesis
In this article I have argued that formal approaches to human economic behavior are useful in testing the
relationships between observations and independent variables. Such studies provide comparative material for
developing hypotheses about the role of individual decisions and empirical variables on communal action
problems, such as maintaining social norms. This approach has uncovered measurable factors contributing to
fairness, which may be ultimately related to the sustainability of small-scale economies. Such cultural
continuities may seem irrational or outdated to the outsider or non-specialist. Nonetheless, these factors may
also be of interest to those looking into questions about the evolution of human sociality, particularly the
maintenance of social norms in societies without systems and institutions for formal social control.
I have also argued that in order to understand the development of specific examples of social norm maintenance
(e.g., communal sharing after the collapse of the Soviet economy in Siberia) one must also understand the
traditional communicative practices and social processes that set goals, values, or standards. Maintaining
Widlok’s call for developing an analytical scheme useful across ethnographic cases, one might expect to find a
variety of non- demonstrative inferences targeted at maintaining authority in one society and egalitarianism in
others. Social structure (limits on agency) in this perspective is not a template existing “out there” in the
collective unconscious, but is the behavioral result of individuals involved in communication and acceptance of
language that reflects mutual respect, influence, and authority. Similarly, Karp (1986) uses the concept of
agency in a general sense that emphasizes the relevance of factors other than self-interest, such as knowledge,
consciousness and personhood. Gell also emphasizes social agency in his definition of art: the presence of an
index from which abductions are made (1998: 15). Gell goes beyond aesthetics, and argues that art is a process
in which recipients abduct relations between persons and things from indexes (objectifications) created by the
artist. The law of the tundra is one such index within social discourse among the Dolgans and the Nganasans.
This article is an effort at creating a synthesis between rational-choice and semiotic approaches by
demonstrating that they provide complementary explanations pointing in the same direction. This is an
argument to integrate ultimate and proximate lines of argumentation. For example, the experimental results
indicate high basic levels of altruism in Ust’-Avam, as in other societies with subsistence economies. Among
the Dolgans and the Nganasans, where punishment levels were moderate, certain material factors such as
income and household size still affected offers and rejection patterns in the games. These patterns can help us
to understand the importance of elders and parents in encouraging cooperation through non-demonstrative
modes of communication. Acceptance of such communication reflects mutually agreed on limits to egoistic
behavior. Such traditional communication is not a social structure acting as a template to determine behavior,
but is a tool used to bolster cooperation through positive and negative examples of virtuous practice. As such,
individual advantage may obtain in the form of risk reduction in subsistence or consumption, or coalitional
support within social networks, providing an individual-level pathway for the evolutionary psychology of norm
promotion and enforcement.
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Discussion: An Integrated Approach
Anthropology is widely argued, especially by American anthropologists, to be a holistic enterprise that attempts
to bring in multiple lines of evidence and inquiry in order to develop a broad understanding of the human
condition and human origins. This article follows in that tradition by bringing together two rather disparate
approaches to the question of social norm perpetuation. The gap between these two approaches is closed by
taking a step back from the problem and considering the interplay between proximate and ultimate levels of
explanation. The semiotic approach is much more interested in the proximate causes of behavior, in this case the
perpetuation of social norms in small-scale societies. The non-consequentialist approach looks at forms of
communication and how examples (cases) are the result of a particular rule. Developing a language to analyze
communication, including art, across ethnographic cases has much potential. Much of what goes on in all
human societies is more political and social than economic in the strictly rational decision-making sense. The
semiotic approach is a way to understand the dynamics of individual action in a field of relationships. One
might argue that approaches that try to consider the consequences make problematic assumptions or have
problematic methods of measurement. However, if one takes this position without careful consideration, the
evidence from experimental psychology and other interdisciplinary efforts that study the same kind of
phenomena (i.e., social norms and contracts) would be excluded from the anthropological club. The vocabulary
of these efforts is strikingly similar to the non-consequentialist position (i.e., goals, goods, benefits). So why
not make the connection explicit? Anthropology is positioned to make contributions to broad understandings of
social norm perpetuation, particularly as it relates to common-property dilemmas, but we have to engage.
The evidence from experimental studies indicates that humans are strongly predisposed to look at each other’s
behavior in terms of social norms and social contracts. There is a good deal of predictable variation in the
psychology of social contracts, some of which is connected to life-cycle processes, and some of which is
connected to involvement in monetized social contracts. These relationships cannot falsify the bounded-rational
choice prediction but they do open up the avenues for further integrated research (Cosmides et al. 1992).

John P. Ziker is professor of Anthropology at Boise State University. His research with indigenous smallnumber peoples in Siberia has been featured in Science, Human Nature, Human Ecology, Nomadic Peoples, and
Ecology of Food and Nutrition. He has conducted fieldwork in the Taimyr Autonomous Region, the north
Baikal region, and the Tuva Republic.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the participants of the games in Ust’-Avam, as well as those who acted as research
assistants. Funding for this research was provided by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle
(Saale). Funding for the analysis of the experimental games was provided by National Science Foundation in the
United States (BCS 0136761). This article is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant OPP 0631970. I thank Joachim Görlich, Alexander King, and Brian Donahoe for constructively
critical comments.

Notes
1. In comparison with utility maximization, the concept of “rate maximization” is not very common. In
common language and thinking, I argue that there is much interest in maximizing profits (or rates). Stockholders
are interested in maximal profits, and economies are measured in terms of net jobs created and the gross
domestic product. An important measure in Russia is the total wheat harvest.
2. One assumption of rational choice theory is that complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of the
elementary individual actions of which they are composed; another assumption is that people calculate the likely
costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do, and that people will choose to perform actions where
the benefits outweigh the costs (Scott 2000).
3. Dalton (1971) suggests two other meanings of the concept of rational economic behavior. The second
follows Firth (1951), who took a bounded rationality position in which actions are understood as rational if we
understand the social system, including the social goals and institutions, such as feasts or meat sharing, which
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can function to create longer-term stability. Dalton argues that this meaning is tautological because no actions
are irrational. Dalton’s third definition (1971: 987) of rational economic behavior is “understandable behavior
in light of known goals and values of the person behaving,” which he argued is also a tautology.
4. For more detail on proximate and ultimate causation, see Cronk (1991: 29) and Daly and Wilson (1983:
17).
5. Social, economic, and political sciences have developed along parallel lines in recent decades to study the
importance of social structures, as well as the facilitation or constraints these structures provide for individual
action—versus the generative power of individual decisions and actions (through practice)—and their intended
or unintended consequences in terms of social structure (Rutz 1977).
6. Peterson argues that at least four elements seem important to the allocation and circulation of resources in
the domestic moral economy: 1. An ethic of generosity informed by a social pragmatics of demand sharing; 2.
Embeddedness in a universal system of kin classification that requires a flow of goods and services to produce
and reproduce social relationships; 3. Personhood constituted through relatedness but valuing an egalitarian
autonomy; 4. Emphasis on polite indirectness in interaction because open refusal is a rejection of relatedness.
7. Prior to about 1865, thinkers on logic commonly had divided arguments into two subclasses: a class of
deductive arguments (i.e., necessary inferences) and a class of inductive arguments (i.e., probable inferences).
Peirce differentiated inductive and abductive inferences within a class of probable inferences. Abduction and
deduction have something in common however. Both contribute to conceptual or theoretical understanding of a
phenomenon. Induction adds quantitative detail to our conceptual-theoretical knowledge.
8. General information on the Dolgans and the Nganasans can be found in Wixman (1984) and Levin and
Potapov (1964). Soviet ethnographic descriptions of the traditional economies of the Dolgans (Popov 1937,
1964) and Nganasans (Popov 1963, 1966), as well as of their ethnic origins (Dolgikh 1962, 1963), suffer from a
rigid Marxist theoretical approach. Census information from the 1920s, upon which many of these Soviet
accounts were based, can provide valuable information from which less ethnocentric histories of economy,
ecology and identity can be developed today (Anderson 2000; Ziker 2005, 2011).
9. The project “The Roots of Human Sociality: An Ethno-Experimental Exploration of the Foundations of
Economic Norms in 16 Small-Scale Societies” was funded by the National Science Foundation (BCS 0136761).
10.

Detailed statistical analysis of the game results are presented in Ziker (2014).

11. No other independent variables were significantly correlated with MAOs except the number of examples
read. The larger number of examples read, there was an increase in the MAO. A similar finding was made with
Player 1 offers in the DG.
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